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Abstract: The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based 
ones can fulfill requirements of an ideal democracy. We then work out an original voting function 
obtained by hydrizing Borda Majority Count (mean-based) and Majority Judgment (median-based). The 
so-called “Mean-Median Compromise Method” slices between mean and average values. It proposes, 
moreover, a new tiebreaking method computing intermedian grades mean. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In our current democracies, there is, according to Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow (1950 ; 
1951 ; 1963), essentially two ways by which social choices can be made: voting, typically used 
to make a political decision, and the market mechanism typically used to make economic 
decisions (Taylor, 2005). Our concern in this paper is exclusively the former, i.e. voting. 
The Theory of Social Choice concerns methods for amalgamating the appreciations or 
evaluations of many individuals into one collective appreciation or evaluation (Balinski & 
Laraki, 2007). Impossibility theorems stated by Arrow (1951; 1963), Sen (1970a; 1970b), 
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) – only to quote these – highlight the fact that none of 
these aggregation methods fulfills the requirements of an ideal democracy. 
Many results now known as paradoxes abound in the direction to show imperfections of 
the electoral systems. These results tackle usual modes of poll and those which are not 
practically used in any country in the world as well. Instead of discouraging researchers in 
Economics and Social Choice Theory, paradoxes as well as impossibility theorems have on the 
contrary instigated them to conceive and even try out several new methods or aggregation 
functions. These methods are being proposed as alternative to those which are publicly valued. 
As an example, approval voting was tested in France at the 2002 presidential elections first 
round by a team directed by Jean-François Laslier and Karine Van der Straeten (Laslier, 2011; 
Laslier & Van der Straeten, 2004). A second experiment was carried out under the same 
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conditions in 2007 for approval voting and evaluation voting (Alcantud & Laruelle, 2014) by 
Antoinette Baujard and Herrade Igersheim (Baujard & Igersheim, 2007; Baujard & Igersheim, 
2009; Laslier, 2011). The same day of the 2007 elections, another team led by Etienne 
Farvaque, Hubert Jayet and Lionel Ragot (Farvaque et al., 2009) tried out the single transferable 
vote. Various teams still undertook experimental votes parallel to the official one on April 22, 
2012 (Baujard et al., 2013; Balinski & Laraki, 2012a; 2012b). 
Among all modes of poll that are tested in France, one seems to dissociate others on 
philosophical level: it is about the one proposed by Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki. This new 
voting theory is median-based and uses several ways, more or less complicated, for ranking 
candidates. Its authors named it Majority Judgment (MJ) (Balinski & Laraki, 2007; 2010; 
2012a; 2012b). MJ was tested twice in France at the presidential elections of 2007 (Balinski & 
Laraki, 2011; 2012a) and 2012 (Balinski & Laraki, 2012b). Philosophically, it is opposed to 
traditional vote which consists in operating summations of individual preferences votes in order 
to obtain a candidate's value in an election or – more formally – a given situation. It asks each 
voter to evaluate each candidate instead of simply voting for one or more candidates according 
to one's preferences. 
The 6 Feb. 2009 “Numbers Guy” column in theWall Street Journal (“And the Oscar Goes 
to...Not Its Voting System”) contained: “Prof. Balinski... calls (mean-based) range voting a 
“ridiculous method”, because it can be manipulated by strategic voters” (Bialik, 2009). 
However, though in its beginning, MJ already sustains praises and attacks as well from 
scientific community. Greeted in particular by Nobel Laureates Kenneth Arrow, Robert 
Aumann and Eric Maskin for giving the possibility of enriching and moderating the expression 
of one's political choice (Balinski & Laraki, 2011), it is also disparaged by some scientists, in 
particular: 
 Jean-François Laslier from CNRS (Centre National de Recherche Scientifique France) 
who details a whole theory exposing all the weaknesses inherent to the choice based on 
the evaluation of the best median (Laslier, 2010 ; 2012). 
 Warren D. Smith, emblematic range voting (mean-based) defender who devoted a 
whole Web page to MJ weaknesses. 
 Manzoor Ahmed Zahid who proposes a thesis highlighting MJ pathologies and prefers 
to it a mean-based method which he calls Borda Majority Count (BMC). This method 
is similar to evaluation voting except the fact that it a particular tie-breaking mechanism 
(Zahid, 2012). Manzoor Ahmed Zahid has in his thesis seven paradoxical results relating 
to the MJ that the BMC could circumvent. However, as we will see further in this article, 
mean-based aggregation methods (including the BMC) are not either free from any 
reproach. They can, on the contrary, prove more dictatorial than usual modes of poll 
which are already much disparaged. 
In this article, we propose a voting method reconciling both concepts: the mean-based 
concept and the median-based one. But before achieving this, let us recall Borda Majority Count 
and Majority Judgment foundations. 
2. BORDA MAJORITY COUNT 
Let 𝑎 be an alternative and {𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝑘} a set of grades in ascending order 𝑔1 > 𝑔2 >
⋯ > 𝑔𝑘. Let 𝑝𝑗  be the number of voters who assign grade 𝑔𝑗 to 𝑎, where 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑘. One 
then defines the BMC of a by the formula 
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𝐵𝑀𝐶(𝑎) = ∑ 𝑝𝑗 . [𝑘 − 𝑗]
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
For example, let us suppose that we have 5 grades: Excellent (E), Very Good (V G), Good 
(G), Acceptable (A), Reject (R). One assigns 4 points to E, 3 points to V G, 2 points to G, 1 
point to A and 0 point to R. With this coding, let us suppose that 10 voters evaluated candidate 
𝑎 in the following way: 
E VG G A R 
1 2 3 3 1 
 
Then 𝐵𝑀𝐶(𝑎) = 1 × 4 + 2 × 3 + 3 × 2 + 3 × 1 + 1 × 0 = 19 
3. MAJORITY JUDGMENT (MJ) 
Balinski and Laraki's idea to conceive a voting theory completely based on the median is 
justified by the fact that – according to authors – median is not as easier to manipulate as 
average. 
MJ goes beyond arrovian framework: voters do not decide about candidates in terms of  
“… is preferred to…” any more but they evaluate them individually. In practice, in skating 
contest and wine competitions, voters are asked to evaluate each candidate in a language 
understood by all in order to rank candidates. The same applies to Range Voting, though the 
social ranking is established in different ways. While in Range Voting simply the average of all 
evaluations of a candidate is taken as the social evaluation, Balinski and Laraki take the median 
value of all evaluations of a candidate as their starting point, in order to reduce the possibilities 
for successful strategic behavior. In case two or more candidates get the same median value, a 
tie-breaking rule then decides the final social ranking. The MJ is exactly what has been detailed. 
MJ is recent and successful proposal that attracts the attention of many researchers from 
theoretical and experimental points of view. Some of its extensions – inclusive of cases where 
extension comes from the side of MJ tie-breaking rule – are given in (Falco & Garcia-Lapresta, 
2011), (Falco et al., 2013) and (Falco et al., 2014). 
First of all, a common language for grading is required such that all grades are well 
understood by all persons involved. In their experiment at the 2007 French presidential 
elections, Balinski and Laraki took the following common language: 
{𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟,   𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡} 
Definition 3.1 (Common Language). One calls “common language” a set ℒ = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝑘} 
strictly ordered by “>” such that  𝑔1 > 𝑔2 > ⋯ > 𝑔𝑘 (𝑔𝑖 ≥ 𝑔𝑗 ∶= 𝑔𝑖 > 𝑔𝑗 or 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑔𝑗). 
Note that one can have as a common language an in_nite set such as the interval [0, 1] of 
the real numbers with its natural ordering. 
We can notice the possibility for a voter to allot the same evaluation to more than two 
candidates. For this reason, a voter can say that he values a candidate 𝑎 as 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, a 
candidate 𝑏 as 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 and candidate 𝑐 as 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑. In Arrow's framework, these evaluations 
will be rendered by: 
“a is at least as good as b”, “b is at least as good as a”, “a is at least as good as c”, “b is at 
least as good as c”, “a is preferred to c”, “b is preferred to c”, “a is indifferent to b”. 
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Definition 3.2 (Method of grading). A function 𝐹 is a “method of grading” if it assigns to any 
profile a single grade (in the same language) for every candidate. So, 
𝐹: ℒ𝑚×𝑛 ⟶ ℒ𝑚 
(𝑔11, 𝑔12, … , 𝑔1𝑛, 𝑔21, 𝑔22, … , 𝑔2𝑚, 𝑔𝑚1, 𝑔𝑚𝑛) ⟼ (𝑔1
∗, 𝑔2
∗, … , 𝑔𝑚
∗ ) 
 
Where 𝑚 is the number of candidates, 𝑛 the number of judges or voters and 𝑔𝑖
∗ (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) 
the final grade obtained by the candidate 𝑖. 
Properties of 𝑭. It was shown (Balinski & Laraki, 2010) that 𝐹 enjoys the following properties: 
- Neutrality: If each voter reverses his preference, the selected candidate changes too. 
- Anonymity: If one permutes voters (or even with other voters), the elected candidate 
does not change. 
- Pareto-consistency: If all the voters prefer candidate 𝑥 to candidate 𝑦 then 𝑥 must be 
the election winner. 
- Monotoncity: If one or more voters reclassify a candidate 𝑥 better, then 𝑥 does not have 
ultimately to be less better placed in this election. 
- Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: To classify two candidates among several 
others, it must be enough to know preferences of each voter for these two candidates – 
their choices for others do not influence the classiffication between these candidates as 
well as the addition or the withdrawal of a candidate. 
Definition 3.3 (Majority grade). Let 𝑎𝑖 a candidate or competitor with grades 𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, … , 𝑔𝑖𝑛 
where 𝑔𝑖1  ≥ 𝑔𝑖2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  𝑔𝑖𝑛. Then the “majority grade” or “majority rank” 𝑓
𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎𝑖) is by 
definition: 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎𝑖) = {
𝑓
𝑛+1
2 (𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, … , 𝑔𝑖𝑛) 𝑖𝑓 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑑𝑑,   
𝑓
𝑛+2
2 (𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, … , 𝑔𝑖𝑛)  𝑖𝑓 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛.
 
For example, if 5 judges allot grades 4, 8, 7, 9, 5 to 𝑎𝑖 then 𝑓
𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎𝑖)  =  𝑓
3(9, 8, 7, 5, 4)  =  7 
and if 8 judges allot grades 9, 7, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5, 8 to 𝑎𝑖 then 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎𝑖) = 𝑓
5(9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 5, 4, 3)  =  5 
Tie-Breaking (Balinski & Laraki, 2007). When the majority grades of two candidates are 
different, the one with the higher majority grade naturally ranks ahead of the other. The majority 
ranking ≻𝑚𝑎𝑗 between two candidates evaluated by the same jury is determined by a repeated 
application of the majority grade: 
- If 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎)  >  𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑏) then 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑎𝑗  𝑏 
- If 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎)  =  𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑏) then one grade (majority grade) is dropped from the grades of 
each of the competitors, and the procedure is repeated. 
 
Balinski and Laraki (2010) give the following example to illustrate this definition:  
Suppose 𝑎 and 𝑏 are evaluated by a jury of 7 voters as follows: 
 
𝑎 : 85 73 78 90 69 70 73 
𝑏 : 77 70 95 81 73 73 66 
  
Ngoie, R.-B. M., Savadogo, Z. and Ulungu, B. E.-L. (2015), New prospects in social choice theory: 
median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking. Advanced Studies in Contemporary 
Mathematics, 25(1):19-38. 
 
 
23 
 
Then the ordered profile is: 
𝑎 : 90 85 78 73 73 70 69 
𝑏 : 95 81 77 73 73 70 66 
After three iterations, one obtains 𝑓3
𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎) = 78 > 𝑓3
𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑏) = 77 and then 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑎𝑗 𝑏. 
It is clear that the majority ranking always ranks a candidate ahead of another unless both 
are assigned an identical set of grades by judges. 
In the case of many judges or voters (presidential elections for example), Balinski and 
Laraki present another simplified tie-breaking rule. 
Definition 3.4 (Majority gauge). The “majority gauge” of a candidate with 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎) = 𝛼 is a 
triplet (𝑝𝐴, 𝛼
∗, 𝑞𝐴)) where 𝑝 is the number or percentage of the candidate's grades above the 
majority grade, 𝑞 is the number or percentage of the candidate's grades below the majority 
grade, and 
𝛼∗ = {
𝛼+ 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 > 𝑞,
𝛼− 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 ≤ 𝑞.
 
𝛼∗ is called the candidate's modified majority grade. 
Let 𝛽 another majority grade, by definition, 𝛼∗ >  𝛽∗ iff  𝛼 > 𝛽 or (𝛼 = 𝛽  and 𝛼∗ = 𝛼+and 
𝛽∗ =  𝛽−). 
Balinski and Laraki use majority gauge to define the majority-gauge-ranking ≻𝑚𝑔. 
Definition 3.5 (Majority-gauge-ranking). Let 𝑎 and 𝑏 be two candidates with majority-gauges 
(𝑝𝑎, 𝛼𝑎
∗ , 𝑞𝑎) and (𝑝𝑏, 𝛼𝑏
∗ , 𝑞𝑏) respectively. Then 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑔 𝑏 or (𝑝𝑎, 𝛼𝑎
∗ , 𝑞𝑎) ≻𝑚𝑔 (𝑝𝑏, 𝛼𝑏
∗ , 𝑞𝑏) iff 
𝛼∗ > 𝛽∗ or 𝛼𝑎
∗ = 𝛼𝑏
∗ = 𝛼+ and  𝑝𝑎 > 𝑝𝑏) or (𝛼𝑎
∗ = 𝛼𝑏
∗ = 𝛼− et 𝑝𝑎 < 𝑝𝑏). 
Manzoor Ahmed Zahid (2012) shows that majority-gauge-ranking may not slice between 
candidates in exceptional cases. A theorem stated by Balinski and Laraki (Theorem 14.1 in 
(Balinski & Laraki, 2010)) shows that: 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑔 𝑏 ⟹ 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑎𝑗 𝑏. 
Ahmed Zahid (2012) then takes an example which illustrates a case where 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑎𝑗 𝑏, but 
neither 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑔 𝑏 nor 𝑏 ≻𝑚𝑔 𝑎. 
Candidate 𝑝 Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor Reject 𝑞 Total 
𝑎 5 2 3 3 1 3 3 7 15 
𝑏 6 3 3 2 0 2 5 7 15 
The majority gauge for a is (5,  𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑−, 7) and that of b is (6,  𝐵𝑖𝑒𝑛−, 7). As 𝑞𝑎 = 𝑞𝑏 = 7, 
majority-gauge-ranking does not give any decision while one easily checks that 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑎𝑗 𝑏. 
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4. MEAN-MEDIAN COMPROMISE METHOD (MMCM) 
Taking into account MJ and BMC, we work out an original method able to reach as well 
distinctly as jointly the two theories and which would circumvent a maximum of paradoxes 
presented farther in this paper. This method makes it possible to decide between the median 
and the average. 
4.1. Concepts and description of the MMCM 
The method that we present in this article is based at the same time on the median and the 
average. One proceeds by a division of the grades distribution for a candidate in 2k intervals 
with the same amplitude. This division determines 2k +1 grades which are the points that limit 
the intervals. The function returns as candidate evaluation a real number corresponding to the 
arithmetic mean of 2k+1 selected grades while extreme values are excluded (Olympic average). 
 
Figure 1. Division of the grades distribution in 2k intervals. 
Definition 4.1 (Olympic average). Let 𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝑛 be a succession of n data such as 𝑔1 ≥
𝑔2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑔𝑛. One calls “Olympic average” of these data the number: 
 ?̅?𝑜 =
1
𝑛 − 2
∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=2
 
The Olympic average of 𝑛 data is then the arithmetic average of these data, when the two 
extreme values (largest and smallest) are dropped. 
 
Definition 4.2 (Amplitude of a division). Let 𝑁 = {1, 2, … , 𝑛} be the set of n judges, we call 
amplitude of a division the real number:  
𝜚 =
𝑛+1
2𝑘
                                                                                                                                                                               (1) 
with 𝑘 a whole number called “division degree”. 
Definition 4.3 (Intermedian grades). Let 𝑎𝑖 be a candidate or competitor with grade 
𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, . . , 𝑔𝑖𝑛 such that 𝑔𝑖1  ≥  𝑔𝑖2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  𝑔𝑖𝑛. A grade 𝑔𝑖𝑗 is called “intermedian” if and only 
if ∃𝑚 ∈  𝑁 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 1 ≤  𝑚 ≤  2𝑘 − 1) such that [𝜚. 𝑚]  =  𝑗 where [𝜚. 𝑚] is the whole number 
that is nearest to ρ. m and ρ the amplitude of division for a fixed division degree 𝑘. 
We note ℳ𝑘 the set of non-redundant intermedian grades obtained from a division degree 𝑘. 
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The so-defined ℳ𝑘  is the set of data involved in the Olympic average calculation of points 
which are bounds (higher or lower) of 2𝑘 intervals obtained after division. 
Definition 4.4 (Average Majority Compromise). Let ai be a candidate or competitor with 
grades 𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, … , 𝑔𝑖𝑛 where 𝑔𝑖1  ≥ 𝑔𝑖2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  𝑔𝑖𝑛 and  ℳ𝑘 = {𝑔𝑖1
∗ , 𝑔𝑖2
∗ , … , 𝑔𝑖𝑗
∗ } the set of his 
or her intermedian grades obtained from division degreek. Then the “average majority 
compromise”, or “average majority evaluation” or “average majority rank” 𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) is by 
definition: 
𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) =
1
𝑗
∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑚
∗𝑗
𝑚=1                                                                                                                                                 (2) 
For example, if 5 judges assign grades 4, 8, 7, 9, 5 to 𝑎𝑖. One fixes 𝑘 = 2,  𝜚 =
5+1
22
=1.5 
The classified grades in a descending order are: 9, 8, 7, 5, 4. 
 ℳ2 = {𝑓
[1×1.5],   𝑓[2×1.5],   𝑓[3×1.5]} = {𝑓2,   𝑓3,   𝑓5} = {8,   7,   4} 
Therefore 𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) =
8+7+4
3
=
19
3
= 6.33 
And if 8 judges assign grades 9, 7, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5, 8 to 𝑎𝑖. 
For 𝑘 = 3, 𝜚 =
8+1
23
=1.125 
The classified grades in the descending order are: 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 5, 4, 3 
 ℳ3 = {𝑓
[1×1.125],   𝑓[2×1.125],   𝑓[3×1.125], 𝑓[4×1.125], 𝑓[5×1.125], 𝑓[6×1.125], 𝑓[7×1.125]} 
 = {𝑓[1.125],   𝑓[2.25],   𝑓[3.375], 𝑓[4.5], 𝑓[5.625], 𝑓[6.75], 𝑓[7.875]} 
 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7, 𝑓8} 
 = {9, 8, 7, 5, 5, 4, 3} 
Then 𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) =
9+8+7+5+5+4+3
7
=
41
7
 = 5.8 
4.2. Tie-Breaking 
When the average majority grades of two candidates are different, the one with the higher 
average majority grade ranks ahead of the other. The majority ranking ≻𝑚𝑚 between two 
candidates evaluated by the same jury is determined by a repeated application of the average 
majority ranking: 
 One starts with 𝑘 = 2 
 If 𝑓𝑘
𝑚𝑚(𝑎) > 𝑓𝑘
𝑚𝑚(𝑏) then 𝑎 ≻𝑚𝑚 𝑏 
 If 𝑓𝑘
𝑚𝑚(𝑎) = 𝑓𝑘
𝑚𝑚(𝑏) then the procedure is repeated for  𝑘 + 1. 
Let us take the following example to illustrate this definition: 
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Suppose that 𝑎 et 𝑏 are evaluated by a jury of 7 voters: 
𝑎 : 85 73 78 90 69 70 71 
𝑏 : 77 72 95 83 73 73 66 
The ordered profile is:  
𝑎 : 90 85 78 73 71 70 69 
𝑏 : 95 83 77 73 73 72 66 
𝜚 =
7+1
22
=
8
4
= 2  
 ℳ2 = {𝑓
2, 𝑓4, 𝑓6}  
 ℳ2(𝑎) = {85, 73, 70}  and  𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝑎) =
85 + 73 + 70
3
=
228
3
= 76 
 ℳ2(𝑏) = {83, 73, 72}  and  𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝑏) =
83 + 73 + 72
3
=
228
3
= 76 
𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝑎) = 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝑏) = 76. By definition, one repeats the procedure for 𝑘 = 3 and obtains: 
𝜚 =
7+1
23
=
8
8
= 1  
 ℳ3 = {𝑓
1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓4, 𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7}  
 ℳ3(𝑎) = {90, 85, 78, 73, 71, 70, 69}  and  𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝑎) =
90+85+78+73+71+70+69
7
= 76.57 
 ℳ3(𝑏) = {95, 83, 77, 73, 73, 72, 66}  and  𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝑏) =
95+83+77+73+73+72+66
7
= 77 
𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝑏) = 77 > 𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝑎) = 76.57. Alors  𝑏 ≻𝑚𝑚 𝑎. 
In this example the average majority evaluation gives exactly the same result as the 
arithmetic average. This is due to the fact that the set of intermedian grades of each candidate 
is equal to the set of grades. 
Definition 4.5 (Maximum division index). Let 𝑎𝑖 be a candidate or competitor and  𝐺𝑖 =
{𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, … , 𝑔𝑖𝑛}   set of 𝑎𝑖’s grades with 𝑔𝑖1  ≥ 𝑔𝑖2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  𝑔𝑖𝑛and  ℳ𝑘 = {𝑔𝑖1
∗ , 𝑔𝑖2
∗ , … , 𝑔𝑖𝑗
∗ } 
the set of his or her intermedian grades obtained with a degree of division 𝑘. Then, the smallest 
whole number 𝑘 such as  𝐺𝑖 =  ℳ𝑘 is called maximum division index or total division index. It 
is denoted 𝜈. 
 
In the latter example, the maximum division index is 𝜈 = 3. 
Theorem 4.1. Let  be a candidate or competitor and  𝐺𝑖 = {𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, … , 𝑔𝑖𝑛} with 𝑔𝑖1  ≥ 𝑔𝑖2 ≥
⋯ ≥  𝑔𝑖𝑛. If 𝑘 = 1 then 𝑓
𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖)  =  𝑓
𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎𝑖). 
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Proof : 
For = 1, 𝜚 =
𝑛+1
2
 . The only intermedian grade is  𝑓[
𝑛+1
2
]
. It is exactly the value 𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) 
will return. 
If 𝑛  is odd [
𝑛+1
2
] =
𝑛+1
2
  and if 𝑛  is even [
𝑛+1
2
] =
𝑛
2
+ 1 =
𝑛+2
2
 
It is clear that in this case 𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) = 𝑓
𝑚𝑎𝑗(𝑎𝑖).    ∎ 
This theorem shows that if 𝑘 =  1, the result given by the MMCM is the same as that given 
by the Balinski and Laraki method. The MMCM does not move away from the MJ philosophy 
in the sense that it is measure-based and not preference-based (Arrow's framework). Moreover 
on this subject, Balinski and Laraki (2007) argue that a judge may dislike a wine and yet give 
it a high grade because of its merit; he or she may also like a wine and yet, with great 
satisfaction, give it a low grade because of its demerits. A measure provides a common 
language, be it numerical, ordinal or verbal, to grade and classify. In this respect, Arrow's 
theorem means that, without a common language, there can be no consistent collective decision. 
The MMCM can also give the same result as the MJ for other values of k different from 1. 
Theorem 4.2. Let 𝑎𝑖 be a candidate or competitor and  𝐺𝑖 = {𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, … , 𝑔𝑖𝑛} with 𝑔𝑖1  ≥
𝑔𝑖2 ≥ ⋯ ≥  𝑔𝑖𝑛. If 𝑘 = 1 then 𝑓
𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) =
𝐵𝑀𝐶(𝑎𝑖)
𝑛
. 
Proof : 
Let us consider 𝐺𝑖 = {𝑔𝑖1, 𝑔𝑖2, … , 𝑔𝑖𝑛}.  For  𝑘 = 𝜈, 𝐺𝑖 =  ℳ𝑘. So 
𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
Yet 
∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
= 𝐵𝑀𝐶(𝑎𝑖) 
Therefore, 
𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑖) =
𝐵𝑀𝐶(𝑎𝑖)
𝑛
    ∎ 
This result shows that, when division is total, the result of the MMCM is equal to the one 
returned by the BMC. MMCM is in this case an intermediate method between MJ (highest 
median-based) and BMC (highest average-based). For values of 𝑘 varying between 1 and 𝜈, it 
allows to weigh and balance between the advantages and disadvantages of one or the other 
method. 
5. MEAN-MEDIAN COMPROMISE: SIX PROBLEMS 
In this section, we will apply MMCM to some examples which are considered as 
paradoxical results for MJ or for BMC and will see whether the MMCM is in accordance with 
what we hope. 
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By means of scientifically founded analysis and studies, many scientists such as Jean-
François Laslier, Warren D. Smith, Steven Brams or Manzoor Ahmed Zahid opposed as well 
MJ as any other form of aggregation based on "MaxMed ". 
Steven Brams (2011) is much more moderate than others because he accepts the MJ for 
ranking candidates when there is a small jury. 
However, mean-based methods are failing as well as median-based one. The following 
examples stated in a form of problems illustrate weaknesses of mean-based methods and 
median-based one as well. 
PROBLEM 1. Three friends wish to buy a common dish to share but one of them is a muslim 
and thus cannot eat the pork meat. All of them like the beef meat but the non-muslims slightly 
prefer the pork meat. Their profile is as follows: 
 A1 A2 A3 
Pork     9 9 0 
Beef   8 8 9 
 
The median for the pork is 9 and that for the beef is 8. However, the beef meat is the only one 
which meets the approval of all. In this case, the average is quite preferable to the median. The 
MMCM will give the same result as the BMC. Indeed, 𝜈 =2. 
 
PROBLEM 2. Five judges evaluate the performance of two skaters. The table of the results 
is presented as follows: 
 Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3 Judge 4 Judge 5 
A 10 5 6 4 2 
B 4 7 7 5 3 
 
The average mark of skater A is 5.4 and that of the skater B is 5.2 and one can then deduce 
that A > B. Yet 4 judges out of 5 (either 80%) estimate that B is better than A.  The median 
gives B > A. 
Judge 1, because of his too high evaluation for A, imposed his preference to all the jury. 
This is not right for a community wanting to be democratic. 
The MCMM will give the desired result as well. Indeed, the ordered profile is: 
A : 10 6 5 4 2 
B : 7 7 5 4 3 
ℳ2 = {𝑓
2, 𝑓3, 𝑓5  }  
𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝐴) =
6+5+2
3
=4.33 and  𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝐵) =
7+5+3
3
=5.  
Here, MMCM give the same result as MJ: 𝐵 ≻𝑚𝑚 𝐴. 
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One could think that this example is only imaginary and that it cannot occur in the real 
world. The following example is somewhat realistic. 
PROBLEM 3. In the Balinski and Laraki's framework, we get the following results for two 
candidates: 
 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Candidate A 25% 10% 18% 5% 12% 30% 
Candidate B 0% 25% 30% 10% 25% 10% 
 
𝐵𝑀𝐶(Candidate A) =
25 × 5 + 10 × 4 + 18 × 3 + 5 × 2 + 12 × 1 + 30 × 0
100
=
241
100
= 2.41 
𝐵𝑀𝐶(Candidate B) =
0 × 5 + 25 × 4 + 30 × 3 + 10 × 2 + 25 × 1 + 10 × 0
100
=
235
100
= 2.35 
The average gives candidate A victorious whereas it is the candidate B who is better 
accepted by the community. 30% of the population assigned mark 0 to candidate A against 10% 
only for the candidate B. Except for the maximum note, for all other marks higher than 0, B has 
a proportion of the population higher than that of A. The 25% of the population that expressed 
a strong preference for A carried off on 30% that rejected him. In Africa, for example, the 
winning of A would be likely to disturb social peace and stability. 
Finally, probably Balinski was not completely wrong to qualify this method (mean-based) 
“ridiculous”! 
According to MJ, candidate B is the winner. MCMM corroborates this result: 
𝜚 =
100 + 1
22
= 25.25 
ℳ2 = {𝑓
25, 𝑓51, 𝑓76  } 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {5, 3, 0}  and ℳ2(𝐵) = {4, 3, 1} 
𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) = 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) = 2.66  
As there is ex aequo, the procedure is repeated with 𝑘 =  3. 
𝜚 =
100 + 1
23
= 12.625 
ℳ3 = {𝑓
13, 𝑓25, 𝑓38, 𝑓51, 𝑓63, 𝑓76, 𝑓88} 
ℳ3(𝐴) = {5,   5,   3,   3,   1,   0,   0}   and   𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) =
17
7
= 2.42 
ℳ3(𝐵) = {4,   4,   3,   3,   2,   1,   1}   and   𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) =
18
7
= 2.57 
𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) > 𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) ⟹ 𝐵 ≻𝑚𝑚 𝐴 
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PROBLEM 4. This illustration was given by Zahid (2009). 
 Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor Reject 
A 9% 41% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
B 4% 47% 3% 5% 12% 29% 
 
According to the MJ, B wins. However A is judged at least “Good” by all the voters and B 
is more rejected than A by 29 % against 0 % for A. According to Borda Majority Count, A 
would be the winner. Thus, Mean-based methods are not as “ridiculous” as Balinski says it! 
Here again, MMCM corroborate the BMC result: 
𝜚 =
100 + 1
22
= 25.25 
ℳ2 = {𝑓
25, 𝑓51, 𝑓76  } 
 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑}  and ℳ2(𝐵) = {𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡} 
By allotting the appropriate mark to each grade, one obtains: 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {4, 3, 3} and 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) =
4+3+3
3
= 3.33 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {4, 4, 0} and 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) =
4+4+0
3
= 2.66 
𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) > 𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) ⟹ 𝐴 ≻𝑚𝑚 𝐵  
PROBLEM 5. This example is drawn from Ahmed Zahid's PhD thesis (2012). 
 Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor Reject 
A 1% 98% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
B 50% 1% 0% 0% 0% 49% 
According to the MJ, B wins whereas he is rejected by 49% of the population and A is 
judged at least “Good” by all the voters! 
The BMC circumvent this paradox: A is the winner by the average. If we process this 
problem with the MMCM, we obtain exactly the same result: 
𝜚 =
100 + 1
22
= 25.25 
ℳ2 = {𝑓
25, 𝑓51, 𝑓76  } 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑} 
And 
ℳ2(𝐵) = {𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡} 
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By assigning the appropriate mark to each grade, one obtains: 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {4, 4, 4} and 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) =
4+4+4
3
= 4 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {5, 4, 0} and 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) =
5+4+0
3
= 3 
𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) > 𝑓3
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) ⟹ 𝐴 ≻𝑚𝑚 𝐵 
MMCM circumvents also this paradox of the MJ. 
PROBLEM 6. Zahid (2009, 2012) presents another example similar to the precedent. 
 Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor Reject 
A 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 
B 0% 0% 0% 0% 51% 49% 
 
According to MJ, B wins whereas 100 % of the electorate estimate that he is at most “Poor” 
(with 49 % of rejection) and that A is considered to be “Excellent” by half of the electorate. 
The BMC is, here, preferable for MJ because the average of A is higher than that of B. 
If we process this example by MMCM, we obtain: 
𝜚 =
100 + 1
22
= 25.25 
ℳ2 = {𝑓
25, 𝑓51, 𝑓76  } 
 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡} 
And 
ℳ2(𝐵) = {𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟, 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟, 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡} 
By assigning the appropriate mark to each grade, one obtains: 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {4, 4, 4} and 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) =
5+0+0
3
= 1.66 
ℳ2(𝐴) = {5, 4, 0} and 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) =
1+1+0
3
= 0.66 
𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) > 𝑓2
𝑚𝑚(𝐵) ⟹ 𝐴 ≻𝑚𝑚 𝐵 
Examples 1 to 6 constitute paradoxical results detailing the individual incapacity of both 
mean and median approaches to provide logically plausible results in all cases. These problems 
are all solved by a method of compromise: the MCMM. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this article, we presented a new voting system obtained by hybrizing Borda Majority 
Count (2009, 2012) and Majority Judgement (Balinski & Laraki, 2007; 2010; 2012a). The 
extension of each one of the two above mentioned methods consists of dividing the ordered 
grades/marks list into 𝑚 equal parts and retaining only the bounds of the internal parts. The 
value returned by Mean-Median Compromise Method (MMCM) is the average of selected 
grades/marks (intermedian grades). We propose also a tie-breaking mechanism by increasing 
the number of parts in the list of grades. The suggested tie-breaking rule differs as well from 
the BMC as the MJ. 
MCMM coincides with BMC when the number of division is equal to the maximum 
division index and agrees with the MJ when the number of division is equal to 1. We thought 
fit that, as coincidence with the MJ can be also observed for values of number of division 
different from 1, it is necessary to begin the process with a number of division equal to 2. 
The article refers to six didactic examples made from situations discussed for BMC and 
MJ. For each evoked paradox, if one of the two opposite methods circumvents it, MMCM 
circumvents it too. MMCM then appears like a better compromise between both methods. It 
keeps, indeed, the common properties of its parents, namely: 
 it maximizes the voter-expressivity; 
 it fulfills the criteria of anonymity, neutrality, unanimity, monotoniciy and Arrow's 
Independence of the Irrelevant Alternatives; 
 it is reduced to the approval voting if the allowed scores are restricted to the two values 
0 and 1, i.e. each voter “approves (1)” or “disapproves (0)” each candidate; 
 it proceeds in a round; 
 it can cause the enthusiasm and the participation of the voters to use a new method of 
really democratic election where they can fully express their opinion; 
 it enjoys immunity to candidate cloning ; 
 it has the enjoyable property that “betraying one's favorite candidate does not pay the 
voter! ” – voter does not take advantage of strategic vote any more. 
 it easily allows having no opinion votes; 
 it evades to some extent the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorems. 
However, it also inherits the insufficiencies of its parents, namely: 
 it is not Condorcet-consistent (Cf. Problem 1); 
 it is not join-consistent and does not circumvent the no-show paradox (considering that 
MJ does not fulfill them);  
 the offsetting effect of the arithmetic mean (which hurts BMC), although reduced, 
always exists. 
 
The above-mentioned weaknesses are not in the same magnitude as for BMC and the MJ. 
Besides, Condorcet-consistency, as problem 1 shows it, is not always a desirable condition in 
an election. It would not be astonishing that one finds cases where the MMCM is vulnerable to 
join-inconsistency and the No-Show paradox which hurt MJ. 
In a forthcoming publication, we will analyze MMCM and will study its vulnerability visa-
vis paradoxes from which the BMC and the MJ suffer. We hope to show that the MMCM is 
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less vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority which hurts MJ and expose the fact that BMC 
gives too much power to strategic voters who assign extreme grades. MCMM stands it. 
Acknoledgments: The authors are grateful to Jean-François Laslier and anonymous referee 
for their helpful suggestions and comments. 
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